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Small Business Capital 
Structure Choice
Dr. Jacques A. Schnabel
A simple single-period model of entrepreneurial capital structure choice 
under conditions of informational asymmetry is developed. The 
uncertain terminal cash flow generated by a business venture is assumed 
to depend on both the amount of effort provided by the entrepreneur and 
the quality of the business venture. External financing induces the effort- 
averse entrepreneur to reduce the amount of effort he exerts. However, 
by astute choice of capital structure, the entrepreneur can mitigate this 
effect. It is shown that this entails financing high quality ventures with 
debt and low quality ventures with equity. This explains the 
predominance of debt in the capital structures of small firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the stylized facts of small business financing is the heavy usage of 
debt. This phenomenon has been well documented in numerous empirical 
studies. In their early landmark study Walker and Petty [11] point to small 
firms’ high debt ratios as a distinguishing feature of small versus large firms. 
Andrews and Eisemann [1, p. 76] conclude the following in their 
comprehensive study of small business financing: “... the debt-equity ratio 
for small business is higher than for all business ... the differences in debt- 
equity ratios... have existed for at least the last twenty years.” Heavy reliance 
on debt financing characterizes not just the actual choices of entrepreneurs 
but also their desired choices. Stoll [8, p. 191] cites a 1980 survey for the Heller 
Institute by the Roper Organization in which it was found that only 2% of 
the small businesses surveyed would choose equity financing as their first 
choice whereas 90% would choose debt financing from a financial institution 
as their first choice.
The foregoing naturally leads to the question of what motivates this 
empirical regularity in the financing of small business. The predominant
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view is that this phenomenon is primarily cost-induced. Specifically, there 
are large fixed costs associated with issuing equity securities and maintaining 
a secondary market in the shares. These large fixed costs render the equity 
financing option infeasible for small firms. Only after the firm has achieved 
a certain size threshold are these large fixed costs outweighed by the benefits 
of diffuse equity ownership. Among others, Stoll [8] and Day, Stoll and 
Whaley [3] provide empirical support for this explanation. This view 
regarding heavy debt usage among small firms has elicited various public 
policy responses in attempts to reduce the equity financing cost burden on 
small firms. Cases in point are the Japanese Small Business Investment Law 
of 1963, discussed in Clark [2], which led to the establishment of government- 
funded Small Business Investment Corporations charged with the specific 
mandate to take equity, rather than debt, positions in small firms. In Canada, 
Vencap Equities Alberta Ltd. was established by the Alberta provincial 
government with a similar mandate; see Williamson [13]. Another public 
policy initiative with the same objective of promoting equity investment in 
small businesses is the Qu6bec Stock Savings Plan. This plan grants common 
stock investors in small businesses tax deductions amounting to 100% of the 
cost of the shares; see Turner et al.[10].
Complementary to the foregoing explanation are various agency- 
theoretic interpretations of the phenomenon of small firm heavy debt usage. 
Stoll [8, p. 191] argues for this point of view by initially observing that for 
many small firms most of the financing provided by external capital 
suppliers is in the form of debt held by one financial institution. Since the 
costs of monitoring the entrepreneur can be large when external capital 
suppliers comprise a diffuse group, these costs can be reduced by having a 
single knowledgeable lender. However, as Shleifer and Vishny [7] have 
emphasized, although not in the context of small business financing, the 
same argument can be applied to stockholders, to wit, the presence of a single 
large stockholder can similarly reduce the costs of monitoring the 
entrepreneur as well as address the free-rider problem present in a diffuse 
group of external capital suppliers. Thus, Stoll’s argument is not germane 
to the issue of debt versus equity in the capital structures of small firms. Stoll’s 
argument is really one for having a single large external capital supplier 
rather than numerous small capital suppliers.
A second agency-theoretic perspective on the phenomenon of small firm 
heavy debt usage is provided by Pettit and Singer [6] and van der Wijst [12] 
who apply the Myers and Majluf [5] and Myers [4] pecking order theory of 
capital structure. Basing their theory on considerations of informational 
asymmetry, i.e., managers have superior information regarding the value of 
a firm’s shares, Myers and Majluf argue that equity financing is a negative 
signal of a firm’s value. Although the Myers-Majluf theory provides a
14 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 2(1) 1992
compelling explanation for the general capital structure problem, its 
application hinges on the preexistence of a market in the firm’s shares and 
the financial manager’s adoption of a policy calling for maximization of the 
wealth of existing shareholders. Because small firm capital structures reflect 
the initial financing, of the business venture, the preexistence of a market 
in the small firm’s shares is a difficult assumption to make. It is this problem 
with the Myers-Majluf theory as applied to small business firms which 
motivates this paper. Similarly invoking informational asymmetry 
considerations, this paper develops a simple model of entrepreneurial capital 
structure choice which arrives at a conclusion identical to the Myers-Majluf 
pecking order theory. However, as emphasized later in this paper, the 
identical conclusions are induced differently. This paper’s focus is on the 
entrepreneur’s choice of capital structure as it affects his incentive to provide 
effort subsequent to obtaining the financing. This paper examines how the 
payoff from entrepreneurial effort is allocated between the entrepreneur and 
external capital suppliers and how this allocation is affected by different 
capital structures and business ventures of differing quality. As modeled here, 
it is the dominant role of the entrepreneur in determining the firm’s capital 
structure so as to appropriate to himself the returns from entrepreneurial 
effort which distinguishes the small firm from the large firm. In contrast, 
the large firm’s capital structure choice, as it is modeled in the traditional 
finance literature, involves maximizing the market value of the firm’s 
outstanding common stock by trading off agency costs and tax effects.
The plan for this paper is as follows. The next section develops a simple 
model in which an entrepreneur wishes to finance a single-period business 
venture with an uncertain terminal cash flow that depends on the amount 
of effort provided by the entrepreneur. The section also examines how the 
marginal payoff from entrepreneurial effort is allocated between the 
entrepreneur and external capital suppliers. Section III considers how this 
allocation affects the entrepreneurial incentive to provide effort, 
demonstrating the adverse effect of external financing. Section IV then 
discusses how ventures of differing quality affect the allocation of the 
marginal payoff from entrepreneurial effort. There the critical result of this 
paper is demonstrated, namely high (low) quality business ventures tend to 
be heavily debt (equity) financed. The last section contains concluding 
comments.
II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Consider a single period setting where an entrepreneur wishes to finance a 
business venture with a uniformly distributed uncertain terminal cash flow
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of T. The venture requires an exogenously specified investment of I at the 
start of the period. To simplify the presentation, universal risk neutrality 
and a zero time value of money are assumed. Whereas the lower bound of 
T  is zero, the upper bound is determined by both the entrepreneur’s effort, 
denoted e, and the quality or potential profitability of the venture, denoted 
r. Both entrepreneurial effort and the venture’s quality interact to determine 
the venture’s maximum possible cash flow. Thus,T is uniformly distributed 
in the interval [o, er \  Informational asymmetry prevails at the start of the 
period when the venture has to be financed. Thus, while the entrepreneur 
knows the values of e andr, the values of these two parameters are unknown 
to external capital suppliers, i.e., potential debtholders and stockholders. 
However, at the end of the period when all uncertainties are resolved, no 
informational asymmetry remains.
Let f{T\e) and F{T\e) denote, respectively, the probability density 
function and the cumulative probability distribution of the venture’s 
terminal cash flow conditional on the entrepreneur’s effort. Given the 
uniform distribution assumption, for T  in the interval [o,er], /(Tfe) =  1/ 
er and F(Tle) =  T/er. Observe that for ei >  e\, F{T\ei) >  F{T\e-2). Thus, 
greater entrepreneurial effort results in a first degree stochastically dominant 
business venture. By the same token, holding the amount of effort exerted 
constant, a higher quality venture first degree stochastically dominates a 
lower quality venture. Note that the outcome of a first degree stochastically 
dominant venture need not exceed that of the first degree stochastically 
dom inated venture. Thus, for a venture of fixed quality, greater 
entrepreneurial effort does not imply that the (uncertain) terminal cash flow 
will increase. Similarly, holding entrepreneurial effort constant, a higher 
quality venture’s (uncertain) terminal cash flow does not necessarily exceed 
that of a lower quality venture. In addition, defining “risk” as the dispersion 
of possible outcomes, it is clear, from inspection of the probability density 
function/(TI e) defined earlier, that greater exertion of entrepreneurial effort 
or the choice of a higher quality venture will increase the “risk” of the 
venture. Since the venture is the only activity of the firm which the 
entrepreneur proposes to establish, the value of the firm at the start of the 
period, expressed as a function of entrepreneurial effort, denoted V{e), is given 
as follows.
V { e ) = f j m e ) d t  =  j  (1)
Assuming that the entrepreneur does not have sufficient personal wealth 
to fully fund the venture, he has to attract external investors, i.e., debtholders 
and stockholders. Since the entrepreneur is a residual claimant of the venture,
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he is also a stockholder. However, to reduce verbiage, the term “stockholders” 
is reserved here for external investors who hold common stock as 
distinguished from the entrepreneur who likewise holds common stock. 
Only one type of common stock is assumed in the simple model developed 
here.
The debtholders are promised a terminal payment of D. The beginning 
of period value of the debt, denoted B{e), is given by the following.
B(e) = 1  Tf{T\e)dT +  [1 -  f(D|e)]D
- x - £ . (2)
Observe that B{e) is the sum of two components. The first component 
assumes that the firm is bankrupt, in which case all of the venture’s terminal 
cash flow accrues to the debtholders, whereas the second component assumes 
that the promised payment of D is made in full. Each component is suitably 
probability-weighted.
The stockholders are promised a portion, denoted p, of the venture’s 
terminal cash flow which remains after payments to the debtholders have 
been made. Let S{e) denote the beginning of period value of the common 
stock. Thus, pS{e) accrues to the stockholders whereas {l—p}S(e) accrues to 
the entrepreneur. The value of the common stock is given by the following.
S{e) =  V(e) -  B(e) 
= f (3)
Consider the effect of a marginal increase in the effort the entrepreneur 
exerts. Using primes to denote derivatives, V'{e) =  r/2  is the marginal payoff 
from entrepreneurial effort. This marginal payoff is allocated among the 
firm’s debtholders, stockholders and entrepreneur in the following manner.
Debtholders: B'{e) =  
Stockholders: pS'{e) =  p
/ ^
e (4)
' T  1 D\^-
[ 2  2 t \ e 1 i (5)
) =  ( 1 - P ) T
. 2
I / D\ ^l
2 T \ e l \  (6)
As expressions (4), (5) and (6) are all positive, both the entrepreneur and 
the external capital suppliers partake in the gains induced by greater
entrepreneurial effort. Herein lies the potential for an agency problem, a 
topic addressed in the next section.
III. ADVERSE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
ON ENTREPRENEURAL EFFORT
This section’s focus is on the effect of external financing on the entrepreneur’s 
incentive to provide effort. Let y{e) denote the disutility the entrepreneur 
derives from exerting effort e. Consistent with the existing agency theory 
literature, e.g., Tirole [9, pp. 51-55], y(e) is assumed to be expressed in 
financial terms, additively separable from the financial payoff the 
entrepreneur derives from organizing the venture, and convex, i.e., y'(e) and 
Y'{e) are both greater than zero.
If the entrepreneur is sufficiently wealthy to preclude the need to raise 
external financing, the entrepreneur’s problem may be depicted as follows.
M A X [ V ( e ) - y { e ) - U  (7)
The solution to this problem, denoted e**, is given by the following 
equation.
Yie) =  r/2  (8)
What happens if the entrepreneur requires external financing of (/ — h) 
where/f is the entrepreneur’s financial investment in the venture? In this 
situation the entrepreneur’s problem may be depicted as follows.
MAX [(1 -  p)S{e) -  y{e) -  h]  (9)
The solution to this problem, denoted e*, is given by the following equation.
y'(e) =  ( l - w [ - f
Clearly, y'(e*) <  y'{e**) which implies that e* <  e**. Thus, the presence 
of external financing causes the entrepreneur to reduce the amount of effort 
he exerts which, in turn, diminishes the value of the venture.
The intuition for this result is clear. In the absence of external financing, 
the entrepreneur captures all of the benefits which are derived from 
entrepreneurial exertion of effort. However, in the presence of external 
financing, the entrepreneur captures only a fraction of the benefits while 
incurring all of the disutility from the provision of effort. Thus, in the latter
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case, the entrepreneur is motivated to reduce his effort. Reviewing expression 
(6) and equations (8) and (10), the entrepreneur sets the value of his marginal 
disutility from effort equal to the marginal payoff vv^ hich the entrepreneur 
appropriates. Since y'{e) is increasing in e, v^hatever increases the marginal 
payoff from effort which the entrepreneur appropriates would likewise 
increase the effort provided by the entrepreneur. It is argued in the next 
section that the entrepreneur’s choice of capital structure can have precisely 
this effect. The discussion has so far ignored the potential effect of the quality 
of the venture, measured by the parameter t ,  on the entrepreneur’s choices 
regarding effort level and capital structure for the firm. These are also 
examined in the next section.
IV. VENTURE QUALITY
Recall that the quality of the venture interacts with entrepreneurial effort 
to determine the venture’s maximum possible terminal cash flow. Consider 
the effect of a higher quality venture on the allocation of the marginal payoff 
from entrepreneurial effort among the debtholders, stockholders, and 
entrepreneur. This may be gauged by examining the derivatives of 
expressions (4), (5) and (6) with respect to r.
d -1Debtholders:
Stockholders: ^  =  p
dr
D_
er <0
Entrepreneur: A.
dr
1
- +
1 / D\^|
[ 2 2 I er] .
] = (1 - -P)
>0
D
erl >0
(11)
(12)
(13)
Observe that the higher (lower) the quality of the venture, the lower the 
portion of the marginal payoff from entrepreneurial effort appropriated by 
the debtholders (stockholders). The logic for this result derives from the fact 
that since ceteris paribus higher quality ventures exhibit lower bankruptcy 
risk, the enhancement of debtholder wealth caused by greater entrepreneurial 
effort is smaller for a higher quality venture. Whatever the external capital 
suppliers fail to appropriate accrues to the entrepreneur. Thus, the 
entrepreneur is motivated to adjust the capital structure for the business to 
reduce the portion of the marginal payoff from entrepreneurial effort 
captured by the external capital suppliers. This entails financing high 
quality ventures with debt and low quality ventures with equity.
The intuition for the preceding conclusion may be gleaned by 
considering the following. On the one hand, debt financing reduces the
entrepreneur’s appropriation of the venture’s terminal payoff by a fixed 
amount D in all nonbankrupt states of nature. On the other hand, equity 
financing reduces the entrepreneur’s appropriation by an amount which is 
strictly proportional, equaling p, to the venture’s terminal payoff. 
Entrepreneurial effort yields high returns in high quality ventures. Since 
payments to stockholders exceed payments to debtholders in precisely those 
high quality ventures, the entrepreneur maximizes his incentive to exert effort 
by heavy usage of debt for high quality ventures.
Due to informational asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the 
firm’s potential external capital suppliers, the latter know neither e nor r. 
However, conscious of the entrepreneur’s motivation, external capital 
suppliers would view the venture’s capital structure as a signal of the 
venture’s quality. Debt financing is a positive signal of the venture’s quality 
whereas common stock financing is a negative signal.
Although the preceding conclusion is similar to that derived by Myers 
and Majluf [5] in their pioneering paper as well as Myers [4] in his 
articulation of a pecking order theory of capital structure, the motivations 
are different. The Myers and Majluf conclusion is induced by mispricing 
of the firm’s outstanding common stock. Thus, the use of equity financing 
means that the firm’s managers view the firm’s common stock as overvalued 
by the stock market likewise resulting in common stock financing being 
interpreted as a negative signal. But the story line here is different. The 
entrepreneur chooses a capital structure which will not impair his incentive 
to provide effort. For high (low) quality ventures, this entails heavy usage 
of debt (common stock) financing.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A single-period model of entrepreneurial capital structure choice under 
conditions of informational asymmetry was developed. The uncertain 
terminal cash flow generated by a business venture was assumed to depend 
on the interaction of both the effort expended by the entrepreneur and the 
quality of the business venture. Although these two attributes are known 
to the entrepreneur, the external capital suppliers are ignorant of their values. 
It was shown that external financing induces the effort-averse entrepreneur 
to reduce the amount of effort he provides, resulting in a diminution in the 
value of the business venture. The entrepreneur chooses a capital structure 
for the venture with an eye to ameliorating the effect of external financing 
on his impaired incentive to provide effort. It was shown that this entails 
financing high quality ventures with debt and low quality ventures with 
equity. Cognizant of the entrepreneur’s incentive, external capital suppliers
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would interpret equity financing as a negative signal of the business venture’s 
quality. This provided an agency-theoretic explanation for the predomi­
nance of debt in the capital structures of small firms.
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